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ABSTRACT 
When two- to six-year-old children contribute to argumentative discussion, how do they reason? Can 
Argumentation theory, a discipline that up to now has largely focused on adult expert productions, contribute 
to a psychological understanding of the child? And, in turn, can a close examination of children's 
argumentative moves contribute to the study of inference in argumentation? Our interdisciplinary research 
program ArgImp, at the crossroads of psychology, education and argumentation theory, tries to enrich these 
two lines of enquiry by conducting empirical studies with young children involved in argumentative activities 
and by analyzing them with models and methods borrowed from Argumentation theory (in particular, Plantin, 
1996; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; Rigotti and Greco, 2010).  
Analyses of the efforts to introduce argumentation in learning activities at school reveal the theoretical and 
practical complexity of such ambition (Rapanta & Macagno, 2016; Schwarz & Baker, 2017). However, little is 
known about the psychological difficulties met by children in developing such skills, and the existing 
evidence seems contradictory. This has led us to a theoretical shift from argumentation seen as a "skill" to 
argumentation seen as a "contribution to a critical discussion". Our results show that a consideration of the 
dialogical (and not just individual) nature of argumentation and attention to argumentation as a process can 
help understand young children's reasoning activity and how it is embedded in their larger psychological 
activity. Adults tend to be centered on specific linguistic or cognitive behaviors expected from kids taking part 
in argumentative discourse, while our analyses reveal complex symbolic and relational work that children 
also accomplish in order to produce argumentation. They are active contributors to critical discussions using 
multiple argumentations and introducing issues. Often the inferences that children make are not the ones 
that adults expect and the latter then tend to interrupt them. 
Children help us to shed a developmental light on argumentation: issues and standpoints are not always 
fixed but are likely to evolve in time; discussion issues are likely to be transformed as they are talked about; 
and standpoints are not always present before being co-constructed in the on-going dialogue. 
1. INTRODUCTION
When two- to six-year-old children produce argumentation, how do they reason? Our
interdisciplinary team of linguists and psychologists has two aims in addressing this question. 
One is to contribute to the study of inference in argumentation: we are interested to see whether 
studying how a child engages in argumentation can in some way contribute to Argumentation 
theory, a discipline that up to now has largely focused on adult expert productions. Our other aim 
is to contribute to research in developmental socio-cultural psychology by investigating how 
children produce argumentation; thereby, we hope to enrich the psychological understanding of 
children’s reasoning. In the “Analyzing children’s implicit argumentation” or ArgImp project (see 
Acknowledgments), we have undertaken to study the inferences that children make. As we are 
not studying their language but their thinking as it appears in verbal and nonverbal, explicit and 
implicit elements of discourse, we are interested in delineating as much as possible not only their 
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explicit verbal productions but also the implicit components of their reasoning in the contexts in 
which they occur.  
To this aim, we use some models taken from Argumentation theory as interpretive grids or 
"lenses" that help to pay minute attention to the argumentations produced by children in the hope 
of getting novel descriptions of some aspects of children's reasoning processes. We will see that 
these models can also help to critically scrutinize whether young children have opportunities to 
actively participate in argumentative discussions with adults and to observe what happens when 
they do so. Studying the inferences young children make when they engage in argumentative 
discussions is a means both to gain insights into their reasoning and to appreciate their 
argumentative contributions in a detailed way, which is made possible through the use of fine-
grained argumentation models. In our study, children were observed in a variety of contexts, such 
as everyday family discussions, interactions with adults in designed activities and discussions 
among children themselves or between children and the adult who asked them to resolve a 
technical problem. We will see that our findings, while showing that the argumentation models 
used were important analytical tools, invite extending these existing models to better account for 
children’s argumentation. 
The remaining sections of this article are arranged as follows: Section 2 will present the 
theoretical shift that has been needed to carry out this research as well as our methodological 
choices. After that, section 3 presents some of the main empirical findings of the ArgImp research 
project with detailed examples or references made to published data. Finally, section 4 is 
dedicated to a discussion of the findings and an opening for further research. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
2.1 From a psychological and educational perspective 
When some of the authors started investigating argumentation in children from a 
psychological and educational perspective, our first attempts were mostly relying on what we will 
call here "Approach 1". The focus of attention was on argumentation skills and their promotion in 
students (Schwarz, 2008; Muller Mirza and Perret-Clermont, 2009), a line of research to which 
Kuhn (1991, 1993; Felton and Kuhn, 2001) and many scholars have contributed (for reviews see 
e.g., Golder, 1996; Rapanta et al., 2013; Schwarz and Baker, 2017). Pedagogical activities based
on creative inquiry-based approaches, accurate design and adequate teacher training have
proven that it is possible to support the acquisition of argumentation skills in students and to rely
on argumentative activities to promote learning. Nevertheless, a recurrent question still remains
open in Approach 1: why is it so difficult to get students to produce argumentation in the
classroom when our feeling as parents is that youngsters already have argumentation skills from
an early age? Therefore, we set out to explore children’s "proto-argumentations" (as we used to
call them when we were not a priori convinced that we would observe "real" argumentations). Our
main questions at the start were the following: can two- to six-year-old children contribute to
argumentative discussions? And when they contribute to argumentation, how do they reason?
Thus, "Approach 1" considers argumentation a "skill", namely a competence that the student 
has or does not have and that is manifested through verbal productions. The focus of attention is 
on the individual child (and not on the conversation in which the argumentation takes place), and 
the verbal productions are assessed according to various criteria that allow for a comparison 
between the child's skills and advanced (or even expert) adult skills. Children are usually 
observed and assessed at school; the expert skills that are de facto assumed as terms of 
comparison have traditionally been those of professionals who have to make decisions or try to 
convince their partners (politicians, lawyers, scientists, etc.) or those who are interested in 
argumentation per se (logicians, philosophers, psychologists such as Piaget).  
Educators inspired by "Approach 1" often aim at teaching elaborated linguistic skills that will 
allow students to make explicit complex inter-relations, take into account different standpoints, 
pros and cons, and express standpoints backed up by structured argumentations (thus 
constructing elaborate argumentative productions, such as written argumentative essays, and 
others). Of course, the hope of educators is that such skills, once acquired through specific 
school activities on specific tasks and contents, will then transfer to other situations, in and out of 
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school. However, the issue of transfer raises important methodological questions that have not 
been the focus of much research yet.  
A sub-line of research within "Approach 1" focuses on "arguing to learn", i.e., exploiting 
argumentation to learn specific contents related to school disciplines. This focus considers the 
argumentative activity as a request that will make the students explore the sphere of disciplinary 
knowledge at stake, in particular the information at their disposal (e.g., texts, feedback, etc.), and 
listen to their partners with the decentration and social interactions that argumentation requires. In 
this perspective, students are invited to use linguistic, reasoning and rhetorical resources as 
instruments to explore the multidimensionality of pedagogical objects (scientific phenomena, 
historical events, moral issues, etc.) and hence learn to inquire about them, reason and formulate 
hypotheses. Findings within this approach showed that these processes are likely to contribute to 
a deepening of the understanding of the issues that students are expected to learn (Schwarz and 
Baker, 2017), including their epistemological status (Kuhn, 2005). We should note that, in this 
approach, students are often offered theories in which to situate their hypothesis (for instance: 
evolution in Asterhan and Schwarz, 2007). By this, students are indirectly asked two things: to 
check that their hypothesis can be deduced from the theory they have been confronted with and 
to check that their empirical findings are compatible with the hypothesis; or, vice-versa, they have 
to produce empirical data, draw a hypothesis from their empirical observations, and then check 
that this new hypothesis fits into the theoretical framework well enough to be deduced from it. 
Hence, in such a school context, theory construction and explanation of facts are often described 
as a combination of “abductive” and “deductive” processes, favoring the training of these broad 
types of reasoning patterns and paying less attention to specific types of inferences (in terms of 
argument schemes).  
Social and emotional conditions that are necessary for decentration to occur are considered 
(Muller Mirza et al., 2009; Muller Mirza, 2010; Baker et al., 2013; Schwarz and Baker, 2017) but 
no one has paid much attention to a fine-grained analysis of children's cognitive moves within 
argumentation yet. 
The school activities foreseen by the “arguing to learn” approach require very careful 
designing (Andriessen and Schwarz, 2009). Commitment from the students is not always a given, 
and in no way can it be simply "prescribed" by a teacher (Schwarz and Baker, 2017).  
Although our ArgImp project started on the backdrop of previous studies conducted in the 
framework of "Approach 1", it rapidly shifted to "Approach 2" for different reasons, among which is 
the important problem of some contradictory evidence: very young children were producing 
"spontaneous" argumentations in daily life settings (Schär, 2018), but not in our activities around 
technical problems, i.e., when we wanted them to produce argumentation (Convertini, 2019, in 
line with Greco Morasso et al., 2015; Miserez Caperos, 2017). What was the reason behind this 
conflicting evidence? This question invited us to explore a different theoretical grounding for our 
study. 
"Approach 2" considers argumentation a contribution to a critical discussion and not as an 
“isolated” individual product – that is, it assumes a very different theoretical framework than 
Approach 1. Argumentation is understood as a dialogical activity (Nonnon, 1996, 2015; Plantin, 
1996, 2005; Eemeren and van Grootendrost, 2004; Rocci 2005 and 2008) within a specific 
context that binds, more or less explicitly, the issues, mutual expectations, interactions, rules and 
scripts. Centering on a fine-grained analysis of the children's reasoning within this argumentative 
activity, the approach thus assumed by ArgImp distinguishes two components in argumentative 
inference: the information (or taken for granted aspects of reality) and the reasoning process that 
is operated on this information. This distinction is to some degree analogous to the Piagetian 
distinction between "factual knowledge" about reality (i.e., physical or social-conventional 
knowledge) and what Piaget calls "operatory knowledge" (he also calls it "logico-mathematical 
knowledge"), which operates on factual knowledge (Piaget and Inhelder, 1967).  
An argumentative discussion is always an event situated socially and historically in a context 
i.e., an activity setting: there are issues, mutual expectations, social or professional roles,
interactions rules, and scripts. "Approach 2" does not expect an argument to keep all its meaning
if abstracted from the context and imported into another activity setting with different
characteristics – in this sense, “Approach 2” relies on research on contextualized argumentation
that has been flourishing for more than a decade in argumentation studies.
Whereas many studies of "Approach 1" are concerned with the relation between language 
and thought, "Approach 2" is concerned with the relation between argumentative activity and 
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thinking, as it is manifested in discourse and dialogue. It considers the goals (e.g., decision-
making, knowledge building, problem solving, etc.) and the audience addressed. Research has 
illustrated how even very short socio-cognitive conflicts are likely to foster cognitive development 
(Carugati and Perret-Clermont, 2015). Hence, from an educational perspective, it is important to 
understand the socio-cognitive conflicts that occur in critical discussions with children: between 
adult and child or between children. In "Approach 2", there is no a priori normative model of what 
an educational intervention that enhances argumentation should look like. "Approach 2" is 
monographic, descriptive and explorative both in designed or in "naturally occurring" situations. 
Its intent is to identify early forms of argumentation in their context in order to observe how, why 
and when children try to raise or contribute to argumentative discussions and to explore whether 
(non) existing common ground allows (or does not allow) their reasoning to unfold in a given 
interaction (Trognon et al., 2011). 
From a psychological perspective, "Approach 2" is inspired by cognitive psychology and its 
studies of reasoning. However, most of the studies in this field have focused on the study of 
perception and deductive processes. ArgImp tries to contribute to an extension of this tradition 
along two axes: 1) a focus on children's structures of inference, somewhat similarly to Banks-
Leite (1998) but with a revisited understanding of argument schemes or loci (cf. Rigotti and 
Greco, 2019); 2) special attention devoted to the context of argumentation, including the 
interpersonal and institutional relationships that frame the argumentative situation, as well as 
existing or challenged cultural premises. In ArgImp, we consider these components not as 
"biases" that can affect or “disturb” the child's rationality but as (often implicit) premises that are 
part of the child’s reasoning.  
ArgImp follows in the footsteps of different lines of research, ranging from Piaget's studies on 
children's reasoning, and Vygotsky's attention to the role of interpersonal coordination for the 
development of thinking, to the studies of the architecture of intersubjectivity in communication 
tasks (Rommetveit, 1976; Hundeide, 1985; Linell, 2009), the role of cultural practices (Bruner et 
al., 1966) and the contribution of pragmatics to the psychology of language acquisition and 
cognitive development (Veneziano, 1999; Bernicot et al., 2002). Jean Piaget had hypothesized 
that children’s “wrong” or “seemingly illogic” answers are in fact quite rational if the different logic 
of the child is taken into account. Piaget (1926/1929) started dialoguing with children in open-
ended conversations by means of which he tried to follow their reasoning and to question it in 
order to provoke counter-argumentation and hence access their deeper thoughts. Piaget then 
engaged in describing how, when building on the logics of their actions, children then develop 
different levels of logico-mathematical structures. Piaget’s theory remains mainly centered on the 
study of deductive reasoning and causal demonstrations (Piaget and Inhelder, 1966). ArgImp 
tries to extend the theory to a careful consideration of inferential structures. Grize (1996), a 
former collaborator of Piaget, was critical of this latter’s logico-mathematical description of 
thinking and offered an alternative with his own model, called "Natural logic". Grize's endeavor is 
to account for any speaker's expression of thinking by considering it not as an abstract entity, but 
as a "schematization" (a schematized discourse) addressed towards a specific audience. Indeed, 
the early Piaget (1926/1929) was aware of the role of the audience and of how very difficult it is to 
access children's thinking because their thoughts are always likely to be affected by the 
interlocutor’s questions. However, Piaget seems to have neglected this in most of his later studies 
(with rare exceptions: e.g., Piaget, in his contribution of 1972, considers the role of context and 
social experience). ArgImp and other on-going research projects within our team (Kohler, in 
preparation) are re-assuming Grize's suggestion to consider the expressed reasoning of the child 
(i.e., the argumentation) as a schematization addressed to an audience and, hence, based on 
implicit premises that need to be acknowledged in order to understand such argumentation. 
Recently, a similar perspective has also been fruitfully applied to explore children's "failures" in a 
Theory of Mind test (Lombardi, Greco & al., 2018). In the words of Pramling and Säljö (2015), we 
could say that the effort in ArgImp and in our above-mentioned related research activities is to 
consider "the child as a partner in conversations" and not as "an object of research". As illustrated 
by Anderson et al. (1997), a new understanding of the child's logic can be made possible by 
charitable approaches to their argumentation that reconstruct the implicit by taking into account 
the status of the children’s speech acts and the reality they take for granted. 
Contemporary theories of argumentation invite us to consider forms of reasoning that put the 
reasonableness (not just certitudes or opinions) at the center of attention. This is particularly 
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interesting from a psycho-developmental perspective, as children do not often need to carry out 
demonstrations and provide proof; contrariwise they have to continuously make inferences in 
order to find their way in a world that they are discovering. They take decisions, look for 
similarities, construct images of the world for themselves (leaving them often implicit); they learn 
to understand the consequences of their actions and to decipher the expectations of the people 
they meet. How do they reason and engage in argumentation in such circumstances, which are 
quite different from those of adult professionals or experts? 
2.2 From the perspective of theories of argumentation 
Up to now we have described the origin and interest of the ArgImp project from a 
psychological and educational perspective; but of course, in our interdisciplinary team, we set out 
with the aim of advancing argumentation studies as well. Since the beginning, we have been 
interested in seeing whether studying how a child engages in argumentation may in some way 
contribute to the study of inference in argumentation. We therefore focused not only on the 
explicit part of the children’s argumentation that becomes evident and “audible” in a discussion, 
but we made an attempt to reconstruct their entire inferential process, taking into account also 
what is left implicit during their contributions to argumentative discussions. This requires 
reconstructing these implicit components of children’s argumentation in order to gain a better 
understanding of the entirety of their argumentative contributions.  
To this aim, ArgImp borrowed models from Argumentation theory. First, argumentative 
discussions are reconstructed by means of the analytical overview from Pragma-dialectics (van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 2004), a dialogical approach that considers argumentation as 
a critical discussion, recently considering also the specific context in which argumentation takes 
place. Second, in order to understand what remains implicit in children’s argumentative 
contributions at the level of inferential moves (i.e., at the level of the standpoint-argument 
relations), the Argumentum Model of Topics (henceforth AMT, Rigotti and Greco Morasso, 2009, 
2010; Rigotti and Greco, 2019) is used. The AMT reconstructs two parts of any single 
argumentation: the material-contextual and the inferential-procedural. 
The material-contextual component constitutes the part of the inference that is rooted in the 
context of the interaction. The major premise of this syllogism, the endoxon, alludes to a premise 
that is typically shared in a (local or broader) cultural community. The Aristotelian definition of 
endoxon, as reported in Rigotti and Greco Morasso (2009: 45), defines it as “an opinion that is 
accepted by the relevant public or by the opinion leaders of the relevant public” (ibid., 45). In the 
AMT, Rigotti and Greco (2019) take away the component of the “opinion leaders” and state that 
the endoxa to which arguers appeal are expected to be shared by all the relevant interlocutors 
involved in a specific argumentative discussion. There might be endoxa shared in a family, in a 
classroom, but also broader endoxa relevant to a cultural community and so on. Because endoxa 
tend to be shared knowledge for the interlocutors, they may remain implicit in a discussion for 
reasons due to the pragmatics of conversation. However, in the settings we are considering, 
since children and adults have different knowledge of the world, it is possible that they may not 
always share the same endoxa (see e.g., Greco et al., 2017). This is partially similar to what can 
happen in intercultural argumentation, where the perceived “lack of logic” or the perception of a 
“different logic” can often be traced back to the inability to recover implicit premises appealing to 
culture-specific endoxa (see Rocci, 2006). The minor premise of the material-contextual 
component of the reasoning is called datum. The datum refers to physical facts that are 
observable in the situation in which the discussion takes place (see Rigotti and Greco, 2009) or 
anyway to factual evidence, which may be made explicit in the argumentation or be available to 
the arguers in some other way. In argumentative interactions, data might be explicitly stated, but 
they might also be left implicit, in particular when the speakers have relevant perceptual-factual 
evidence before their eyes. 
The procedural-inferential component constitutes (to adopt Piaget’s distinction as defined in 
section 2.1) the “logical” part of the reasoning, or the source from which the inference present in a 
single argumentation is drawn. The procedural-inferential component is directly based on a locus, 
i.e. a semantic-ontological relation (e.g., cause-effect, witness-position to know, opposite-
opposite, to name but a few) on whose basis standpoint and argument are connected (Rigotti and
Greco Morasso, 2010). Several maxims, or inferential rules, are associated with each locus; a
maxim functions as the major premise in the inferential-procedural component of the reasoning.
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The maxim, associated with a minor premise, concludes with the culmination of the reasoning, 
which coincides with the standpoint that was to be proven (Rigotti and Greco, 2019). The minor 
premise associated with the maxim is the result of the material-contextual component, i.e., it is 
the proposition derived from the association of endoxon and datum: through this proposition, the 
material-contextual and the procedural-inferential components of argumentation are connected. 
The characteristic of the AMT, namely the conjunction of two different components in each 
reasoning, was particularly suited to respond to the needs of the ArgImp project, because we 
wanted to reconstruct children’s implicit premises without neglecting to distinguish not only their 
operational-inferential moves but also the worldview and knowledge they start from when they 
construct their reasoning. 
Using these models as an analytical grid, we proceeded to analyze children’s argumentation 
in various settings (see the next section). 
3. EMPIRICAL DATA
The ArgImp project works on a variety of newly collected and already existing data. In 
particular, two multilingual corpora in two different settings were collected. Corpus 1 consists of 
“spontaneous” argumentation in the family. This means that these discussions that occurred in 
everyday family interactions were not induced in any way. A researcher (Rebecca Schär) visited 
12 families in their homes in three different linguistic regions of Switzerland and registered their 
natural talk. The researcher intended to take a marginal position and not interfere in the 
interactions that occurred within the families. However, as the researcher was physically present, 
sometimes she was asked by the children to participate in different interactions, such as playing a 
game.  
Corpus 2 was collected by another researcher (Josephine Convertini) in two kindergartens, 
one in French-speaking Switzerland and one in Italy. This corpus consists of semi-structured play 
activities that are inspired by Piaget’s studies (1974, 1980) and by activities proposed by the 
foundation La main à la pâte. In the cases collected within this corpus, children are asked to help 
resolve a technical problem by constructing specific artifacts with building blocks and toys. 
The interactions of both corpora were audio recorded. In addition to the audio recording, the 
semi-structured play activities of corpus 2 were also video registered. The oral data were 
transcribed according to an adapted version of the transcription signs proposed by Traverso 
(1999) (see Appendix). 
4. FINDINGS
What have we learned by shifting our perspective from "Approach 1" (argumentation seen as 
a skill) to "Approach 2" (argumentation seen as a contribution to a critical discussion)? This 
section will present some of the findings of the ArgImp research project that are of interest to 
psychologists and educationalists but also to scholars of argumentation; when relevant, we refer 
to previous publications in which more detailed observations and discussions of our findings can 
be found. Because this paper is a retrospective overview of the main findings of the ArgImp 
project, some of the examples we discuss have already been published, in a more extended and 
detailed form, in previous papers as well as in two hitherto unpublished PhD dissertations. When 
this is the case, we clearly indicate it. 
4.1 Children's argumentations are often interrupted by the adult 
Audio and video recordings have made us quickly aware that adults very often do not grasp 
children's argumentative contributions, and they even go so far as to interrupt their contributions. 
This confirms our earlier observations of pedagogical activities (Greco et al., 2017) and Piagetian 
clinical interviews (Greco Morasso et al., 2015; Miserez Caperos, 2017). Sometimes, adults 
inadvertently forget to always leave space for the full development of the child's argumentation, 
even when they intend to do so.  
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4.2 Children are active contributors to critical discussions using multiple argumentations and 
introducing issues 
Our data reveal that, especially when given a space to do so, children are not "proto-
arguers" but actively engage in argumentation. We observe that children even raise new 
discussion issues or sub-issues in already ongoing discussions. They do so in different ways, as 
for instance when they problematize an utterance of an adult or of a peer in order to raise an 
issue or a sub-issue via a callout (Aakhus, Muresan & Wacholder, 2017; Jackson, 2018); or when 
they anticipate a difference of opinion and put forward a standpoint and an argument supporting 
that standpoint (see the proposal of a typology of the emergence of issues in adult-children 
discussions in Greco and Schär, 2018 forth.; Schär, 2018). The fact that children open up new 
issues shows that they are not only able to “play the game” of an argumentative discussion 
initiated by an adult, but they are also interested in setting up their own discussions. Once an 
issue is raised, young children engage in argumentative discussions by putting forward their 
standpoints and supporting them with arguments. In our data, children not only recur to single 
arguments to support their standpoints, they also use complex argumentation (coordinative, 
subordinative, multiple) (Miserez Caperos, 2017; Convertini, 2019). Children also initiate 
completely new issues (Schär, 2018), and sometimes argue to question the issue... making the 
issue an issue (Greco et al., 2017)! 
The analysis of children’s argumentation in our corpora shows that, in most cases, the 
inferential-procedural part of the children’s reasoning may be reconstructed as a correct 
inference: children employ a variety of loci and competently rely on different maxims (Convertini, 
2019). The loci on which children's reasoning is based are often those that the researcher 
indirectly expects when she introduces the task; but children also bring out other kinds of 
reasoning (new loci or new maxims) that were neither requested nor expected by the adult. On 
this point, the AMT analysis of the relationship between loci and maxims helps us to recognize 
the sophistication of children’s argumentation, the variety of alternatives they are able to use, and 
the children’s capacity to take initiative in reframing adults’ tasks and finding creative ways to 
solve them (Convertini, 2019). 
4.3 Standpoints are often co-constructed during the interaction 
In order to contribute to argumentative discussions, children need to feel legitimate to do so. 
This is often the fruit of a "conquest". During some of the activities, we can observe them trying to 
find their physical place or struggling to have their voice heard (Convertini et al., 2017). Children 
try to understand what is happening and what it means, and they test their explorative 
"hypotheses" (Iannaccone et al., in preparation); they also defend themselves when they feel 
neglected or offended; they try to convince others to "ally" with them (Danish and Enyedy, 2015); 
to “go against” their peer's contribution, or to coordinate their own perspective with that of their 
partners’. Argumentation emerges within these processes. Very often children do not have a pre-
existing standpoint on an issue (see Greco et al., 2015; Schär, 2018), either because the issue is 
proposed/imposed by the adults or because the issue arises in response to an “emerging 
problem” in the reality of the conversation. When argumentations are co-constructed in the 
course of the discussion, it seems that the issue has precedence over the standpoint because the 
interlocutors do not have pre-existing standpoints on that issue (as shown in Schär, 2018). The 
co-construction of an argumentative discussion appears then to be a dialogic process; but this is 
possible only if the freedom rule of a critical discussion is fully respected. In this sense, we 
reinterpret the concept of freedom rule as discussed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) 
and note that full freedom in argumentation includes not only the possibility to advance 
standpoints and arguments, but also the possibility to raise, reframe or object to the raising of 
issues or their specific framing (Schär, 2018). 
The jigsaw example 
The "jigsaw example" (from Corpus 1, analyzed in greater detail by Schär, 2018) illustrates 
this point. A discussion (transcribed in Table 1) occurs when Amélie1 (5:8-year-old), as requested 
1 Names have been changed. 
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by the rules of the board game she is playing with the researcher, tries to add a puzzle piece to a 
jigsaw. But Amélie seems to hesitate. The researcher asks "should we check below?" (turn 2, 
referring to the model of the jigsaw depicted on the game board). When the researcher asks 
(probably thinking that she is suggesting a strategy to deal with the difficulty) whether they should 
check the model, Amélie interprets this as an issue, although the researcher originally did not 
intend to advance a standpoint (see the discussion in Musi and Aakhus (2018) on this point). 
Amélie supports a standpoint that they should not check the model of the jigsaw by advancing 
two coordinative arguments: 1.1a “we are a bit stupid” (turn 9) and 1.1b “it is much too difficult” 
(turn 10). More precisely, the arguments put forward by Amélie appear to support the contrary 
standpoint that rather than following the model they should do the jigsaw puzzle in an “anything 
goes” fashion (turns 3, 5 and 10), as signaled especially by the marked use of French n’importe 
quoi in turn 5. Hence, both the standpoint and argument that Amélie put forward emerge out of 
the interaction.  
Table 1. Discussion between Amélie (5:8 years) and the researcher (R.) 
Turn Speaker Transcript (in Swiss German) Our translation 
1 Amélie ((schaut auf das von ihr 
hinzugefügte Puzzleteil)) öppis 
stimmt= 
((is looking at the piece she just added 
to the puzzle)) something’s= 
2 R. söuemer luege ungerdran↑ (3.0) should we check below↑ (3.0) 
3 Amélie das glaub ich das mir lueged 
scho ich duens da aber mir duen 
das puzzle nid guet mache mir 
duend eifach das puez le nid eso 
mache ((zeigt auf Vorlage)) 
i believe that we look really i put it here 
but we don’t do this puzzle well we just 
don’t do this puzzle like that ((indicates 
the model)) 
4 R. a:uso= o:k= 
5 Amélie mir macheds <fr>n'importe 
quoi<fr> 
we do it ((fr)) no matter what ((fr)) 
6 R. okey ok 
7 Amélie s isches e chli: it is a bit: 
8 R. ((würfelt)) zwöi= ((throwing the die)) two= 
9 Amélie xxx simmer e chli blöd xxx we are a bit stupid 
Approximately 15 minutes later 
10 Amélie mir mached wie es chunnt mir 
mached wi h: es h: wi wi wir 
wölled das das puzzle mache h: 
wi wir das wölled du:e weisch 
wieso wi das wil vil z schwierig 
isch 
we do how it goes we do ho h: it h: ho 
ho we want this this puzzle do h: how 
we this want do you know why w this 
because is much too difficult 
11 R. okey ok 
Beyond the co-construction of standpoints in response to an issue emerging in natural 
conversation, this example also hints at another aspect that recurs frequently in the data of the 
ArgImp project, namely that socio-material artifacts (in this case the pieces making up the jigsaw) 
may trigger an argumentative discussion. In this jigsaw example, it remains unclear whether the 
researcher is the only trigger of Amélie’s argumentation or whether she would have started to 
argue her point of view even without the intervention by the researcher. In many cases that we 
have collected, children open up discussion issues because they respond to “emerging problems” 
derived from socio-material artifacts in their playing situations (e.g., a toy car is too big to go into 
a tunnel; a toy person bumps her head). Hence, not only standpoints but also issues are co-
constructed during the discussion via sub-discussions initiated by the children (see Schär, 2018 
for more examples).  
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4.4 Available visual information is not verbally made explicit 
 In very young children, linguistic abilities could be a motive for leaving part of their reasoning 
implicit. However, in our analyses we find other aspects that better account for this fact. Grice’s 
(1975) cooperative principle, stating that the interlocutors should make a verbal interaction "as 
informative as is required", means that repeating what is obvious to the involved interlocutors 
should be avoided (see Lombardi et al., 2018). In our data, the fact that something perceived as 
“obvious” is left implicit is commonly observed in the presence of material objects that seem to 
have a clear meaning, as shown in the “missing pieces” and “TUC® cookie” examples illustrated 
in what follows. 
The missing pieces example 
 In the "missing pieces example" from Corpus 2 (and discussed in greater detail in 
Convertini, 2019), the activity has been designed by the researcher. Three children are involved 
in this activity inspired by Piaget (1980). A blue poster has been glued to the table and two 
mannequins (and their cars) are each placed on opposite sides of the poster. The researcher 
presents the task and explains to the children that the mannequins are friends who live on 
opposite sides of a lake (the blue poster) and want to meet each other. The researcher then asks 
the children to build a bridge with the blocks. After they are finished building the bridge, they lift it 
up and place it on the blue poster to check their work (see transcription in Table 2). 
Table 2. Discussion between Flavio (5:3 years) and Mattia (5:4 years) 
Turn Speaker Transcript (in Italian) Our translation 
(0:25:44.7) 
1 Flavio oh:: ((si avvicina Mattia e indica la 
costruzione del ponte fatta da Mattia)) 
tiriamolo su ((solleva la costruzione di 
ponte ed entrambi la guardano)) ma, 
deve essere ancora più lungo 
oh: ((he goes close to 
Mattia and indicates the 
bridge construction made 
by Mattia)) let's lift it up 
((he lifts the bridge and 
both children look at it)) 
but, it must be longer 
2 Mattia e allora aspetta ((prende dei pezzi di 
lego dalla scatola delle costruzioni e li 
attacca alla sua costruzione))  
and then wait ((he takes 
pieces of Lego® from the 
construction box and puts 
them on his construction)) 
(0:25:46.6) 
The argumentative discussion between Flavio and Mattia may be reconstructed by means of 
an adapted analytic overview (originally taken from van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) as 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Reconstruction of the discussion between Flavio and Mattia 
Issue: (Does this bridge serve its purpose?) 
Flavio, Standpoint 1 
1 (the bridge does not serve its purpose) 
Arguments in support of Standpoint 1 
T. 1 1.1. because it must be longer 
The issue discussed by the children is about the adequateness of the instrument that they 
have built, i.e., the Lego® bridge, in relation to a goal (crossing the lake) that has been imposed 
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by the adult. Flavio’s argument (1.1) is based on the locus from the final-instrumental cause 
(Rigotti and Greco, 2019), elaborating on the connection between an instrument (the bridge) and 
its goal (reaching the other side of the lake). Flavio's argument in turn 1 is that the bridge "it must 
be longer".  
In this case, the instrument (the bridge) is not adequate, because it is shorter than the blue 
poster (the lake). This datum, a material-contextual part of the reasoning (i.e., that the current 
bridge is too short), has a supposedly clear meaning for the children, and it remains implicit in 
their discussion: they do not explicitly say that the reason why the bridge does not serve its 
purpose is because it is shorter than the blue poster, arguably because they can see it. However, 
the fact that they have in mind the goal of the task is clear from turn 1, because the children 
physically lift the bridge and verify whether they have done what the adult has asked them to do. 
Turn 2 is also interesting because, when the children see that the instrument they have built is not 
adequate, they immediately suggest a creative solution, i.e., to change the instrument: Mattia 
says “and then wait” and grabs new Lego® bricks. 
The TUC® cookie example2  (quote from Schär, 2018) 
In the “TUC® cookie” example taken from Corpus 1 (see Table 4), Levin (3:2- year-old) 
initiates an argumentative discussion. When the researcher arrived at this family’s home, Levin's 
mother asks him to give a cookie to the researcher. Levin answers his mother’s request by 
arguing that these cookies are "better not (given) to adults". Thereby, not only does he express 
his refusal to give a cookie to the researcher, but he also raises the issue “Can TUC® cookies be 
given to the researcher?”  In fact, with his argument Levin explains the endoxon he bases his 
reasoning on: “TUC® are not made for adults”. At the same time, Levin leaves implicit in his 
argument an aspect of the reality that corresponds to the datum: namely, that the researcher is 
an adult, because everybody can see this. This unsaid datum is necessary to understand Levin’s 
reasoning: it is only by taking into account this premise that Levin leaves implicit that his 
argument is completely understandable. 
Table 4. Discussion between Levin and his mother 
Turn Speaker Transcript (Swiss German) Our Translation 
1 Levin d R. wett äu ä chli tee (1.0) R. also wants some tea (1.0)
2 Mother m:hm m:hm 
3 Levin die do= these ones= 
4 Mother und no es Tuc ((keks)) 
chaschere äno geh 
and a Tuc ((cookie)) you can give her one 
too 
5 Levin es↑ a↑ 
6 Mother es Tuc (3.0) a Tuc (3.0) 
7 Levin nid ade erwachsnig gschider better not to adults 
8 Mother momol die sind ä für die 
erwachsnige 
yes yes they are for adults too 
In turn 7, Levin answers his mother’s request by arguing that these cookies are "better not 
(given) to adults". Thereby, not only does he express his refusal to give a cookie to the 
researcher, but he also raises the issue “Can TUC® cookies be given to the researcher?” The 
argumentative discussion between Levin and his mother can be reconstructed by means of an 
analytic overview (adapted from van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) as presented in Table 5.  
2	The TUC® cookie example has been presented at the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation in Fribourg (2017), 
analyzed in Greco, Perret-Clermont et al. (2018), as well as in Schär’s (2018) unpublished PhD dissertation; the excerpt 
and analysis presented here are quotes from the dissertation. Our readers will find in these previous publications some 
different and more detailed analyses. We reproduce this example here because of its representativeness in terms of how 
the context of the interaction impacts on the argumentation. 
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Table 5. Reconstruction of the discussion between Levin and his mother 
Issue: Can TUC® cookies be given to the researcher? 
Mother, Standpoint 1 Levin, Standpoint 2  
T. 4 1 (yes) T. 7 2 (no) 
Argument in support of Standpoint 2 
T. 7 2.1 better not for adults 
In order to better understand how Levin’s argument 2.1 relates to the issue, it is worth 
considering the material-contextual part of his reasoning, as it is analyzed in the AMT (see 
section 2; Rigotti and Greco Morasso, 2009; Rigotti and Greco, 2019). In fact, with his argument 
Levin explains the endoxon he bases his reasoning on: “TUC® are not made for adults”. At the 
same time, Levin leaves implicit in his argument an aspect of the reality that corresponds to the 
datum. The datum, namely that the researcher is an adult, in this case is “visible” to all involved. It 
is only by taking into account this premise, which Levin leaves implicit arguably because it is 
physically visible, that his argument “these cookies are better not given to adults” is completely 
understandable.  
In this sense, the analysis of the implicit component of the children’s argumentation in these 
two examples (“missing pieces” and “TUC® cookie”) shows how some “obvious” contextual 
aspects may make the explicitation of the entire argumentation superfluous. The material object 
in the first example (the bridge), as well as the characteristics of the researcher in the discussion 
between Levin and his mother, are premises that support the children’s arguments but are not 
made explicit, because they are available otherwise to the participants in these situations. 
Reconstructing the components children leave implicit in their argumentation, either because they 
are  “visible” or because they are “taken for granted” (see paragraph 4.5), allows for a better 
Endoxon: TUC® 
cookies are not made 
for adults 
Datum: R. is an 
adult 
First conclusion – Minor premise: TUC® 
cookies are not made for R. 
Final conclusion: I should better not 
give a TUC® cookie to R. 
Maxim: If something is 
not made for X, it should 






understanding of the role that argumentation has in this interaction and the meaning children 
attribute to it. 
The observation of Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle, hence leaving implicit what can be 
thought of as known by all those involved, may be at the basis of another important finding of the 
ArgImp project that will be discussed in the next section. 
4.5 Uses of the argument of authority and "Weltanschauungen" 
Fine-grained analyses of argumentation can also allow us to explore the "worlds" in which 
children navigate. There is a lot to learn from investigating the many aspects of their 
Weltanschauung, among which are children's understanding of rules and of their legitimacy. 
Rules can help to comfort one's position, to avoid changing it, or to find a way out of a difficult 
situation. It is not by chance that in play situations we have often found children interacting in a 
more horizontal way with their parents and arguing to legitimize their standpoints with 
authoritative arguments in which parents are not the source of authority (reminding us of Piaget's 
famous book, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932), in which he comes to the conclusion that 
horizontal interactions are sources of moral reflection and allow children to transform their 
understanding of the role of rules). 
A close analysis also reveals that endoxa are not always shared by adult and child as in the 
"Memory board game example" (Schär, 2018; Schär and Greco, 2018). In this example, a father 
and his daughter are playing a board game. The father's endoxon seems to be that the game he 
is playing with his daughter relies on a specific set of rules (arguably, those written on the board 
game box), whereas the daughter appeals to a different endoxon, which is drawn from her 
experience (imagined or real?) in day care. In particular, Elina and her father are playing a widely 
known board game consisting of a number of pairs of identical cards placed upside down on a 
surface. The players can turn two cards per turn with the goal of finding two identical cards. If 
they fail to do so, they have to pass their turn. If they succeed, they are credited with two points 
and can turn two more cards. Suddenly, Elina realizes that she has just failed to match the card 
she has in her hand but realizes that the card next to the one she has just drawn would probably 
match the first card she turned over. Hence, she would like to continue turning over cards. Her 
father tries to stop her: "no hang on Elina it’s not your turn=", "wait a minute you can always only 
turn over two per turn"). Elina continues: "but in Chrabolino3 i took two again two again two again 
and two again=", appealing to an argument of authority that goes against her father's standpoint. 
In this case, the “clash” between the father’s and the daughter’s Weltanschauungen regarding 
authority in board games suggest a possible way to understand why they have a difference of 
opinion in argumentation and how to study it: comparing endoxa and their discrepancies. 
The little Lego® blocks example 
The extract presented below in Table 10 is part of corpus 24. The activity presented here is 
the same as in the missing pieces example: three children have to build a bridge with Lego® 
blocks. Large and small blocks are available. 
Mia (4:7 years) works alone, while Giacomo (5:2 years) and Fulvio (4:6) work together. Mia 
used large blocks and the two boys used small blocks. The construction made by Mia is longer 
than that of the two boys. She decides to place it on the blue poster. After placing her 
construction on the blue poster, she turns to the other children.  
Table 10 Discussion between Mia and Giacomo 
Turns Speakers Transcription Our translation 
(0:26:17.9) 
1 Mia Giacomo, guarda me Giacomo, look at me 
2 Giacomo non è mica, eh però non è it's not, but it shouldn't be a ship), 
3 The day care Elina goes to is called Chrabolino (all names, including this one, have been modified for reasons of
privacy).  
4 This example is translated and adapted from Convertini (2019). 
12
mica una nave, è vero? 
((guarda la ricercatrice)) 
deve ecce un ponte 
right? ((he looks at the researcher)) it 
must be a bridge 
3 Mia lo so I know 
4 Giacomo grosso come questo 
((guarda la sua 
costruzione)) 
Big like this one ((he looks at its 
construction))  
5 Mia sì, ma io l'ho già quasi fatto 
((continua ad attaccare 
pezzi di LEGO® grandi alla 
sua costruzione)) 
yes, but I've already almost done it 
((she puts large LEGO® on to her 
construction)) 
6 Giacomo Ma (.) però (.) non ci deve 
fare solo con quelli ((i 
LEGO® grandi)), noi 
abbiamo preferito anche 
con questi ((i LEGO® 
piccoli), Mia (.) Perché no 
con questi piccoli?  
But (.) (.) however (.)we should not 
do it  only with those ((the large 
blocks)), we have also preferred with 
these ((the small blocks)), Mia (.) 
Why not with these little ones? 
7 Mia perché sennò ci vuole 
ta::nto 
Because, otherwise it takes a lot of 
time 
8 Giacomo Perché (1.0) ma Gina (una 
maestra) non vuole che 
facciamo con quelli piccoli  
Because (1.0) but Gina (one of the 
teachers of the day care)  doesn't 
want us to do with the little ones 
9 Mia Sennò ci vuole ta::nto lo sai, 
Giacomo mio  
Otherwise it takes a lot of time, you 
know Giacomo, my dear one 
(0:27:09.1) 
The argumentative discussion between Giacomo and Mia can be reconstructed by means of 
an analytic overview (slightly adapted from van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004 to introduce the 
issue). It is presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 Reconstruction of the discussion between Giacomo and Mia (4:7 years) 
Issue: Can the bridge be made with small Lego blocks? 
Giacomo, Standpoint 1 Mia, Standpoint 2 
T.6  1 The bridge can also be done with the 
small Lego 
 2 (The bridge cannot be 
done with the small Lego) 
Does not offer supporting arguments, but only 
addresses a critical question (Q) to Standpoint 2 
and “concedes” an argument in support of it. 
Arguments in support of Standpoint 
T.6 Q2 Why not with these little ones? T.7 2.1 Because, otherwise it takes 
a lot of time 
T.8 2.2 Because it is forbidden by Gina to 
use small Lego (in this kindergarten) 
T.8 2.2 [Because it is forbidden by 
Gina to use small Lego (in 
this kindergarten)] 
T.9 2.2.1 (It is forbidden) because it
takes too long 
The argumentative exchange between Mia and Giacomo is peculiar and involves, again, the 
childrens’ positioning with respect to rules and authority. While Giacomo clearly expresses his 
point of view (1) in T.6, he does not follow with supporting arguments. Rather, he challenges Mia 
to defend the contradictory standpoint (2), which he attributes to her. Normatively, this could be 
construed as the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1987). It 
is doubtful, however, that is this construal is an adequate characterization of the exchange. As 
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the immediate follow-up shows, Giacomo’s moves appear to be more exploratory than persuasive 
or tactical. In any case, Mia does pick up the challenge and assumes the burden of proof, 
producing a practical argument (2.1) in T.7: it would take much more time to do the construction 
with small Lego blocks therefore it is efficient to work with the large ones. Unexpectedly, Giacomo 
in T.8 produces a second, independent, argument in support of Mia’s standpoint (2.2), in what 
looks like a concessive move. This argument is related to the authority of the kindergarden rules 
(teacher Gina has enforced a rule about what building blocks can be used in the kindergarden). 
Yet, Giacomo has already made clear that he is not aligned with the authority of teacher Gina and 
with her rule (“Why not with these little ones?”). Perhaps, he attributes to Mia an implicit reference 
to her authority, seeing Mia’s behavior as rule-following. Mia’s reply in T.9 goes back instead to 
the pragmatic justification, either simply repeating her argument of T.7 or, on a richer 
interpretation, presenting the pragmatic argument subordinatively as the justification of teacher 
Gina’s rule (2.2.1). This richer interpretation is supported by Mia’s remark: “you know that 
Giacomo, my dear one”, which is consistent with a scenario where both the rule and its pragmatic 
justification should be known to Giacomo –  because they have been (repeatedly?) stated by 
teacher Gina. In the end, Mia also implicitly criticizes the two boys for having used small blocks, 
when they should have known better. 
While in the previous example Elina used an authority to go against her father’s endoxon, in 
this case Giacomo and Mia position themselves with respect to the teacher’s authority, 
questioning or justifying it. In both cases, the study of endoxa seems to open a promising path to 
unveil the children’s Weltanschauung, in particular what they consider ‘authorities’ in relation to 
the activities they are playing.  
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
When two- to six-year-old children contribute to argumentative discussions, how do they 
reason? By addressing this question, our interdisciplinary project, ArgImp, tries to contribute to 
the study of inference in argumentation and to the psychological understanding of children's 
reasoning when they produce argumentation. The research presented here has convinced us of 
the heuristic value of changing the level of analysis: from a focus of attention centered on the 
child considered in isolation and compared to the adult in terms of argumentative skills and 
cognitive behavior, to a consideration of the child as engaged in activities with a conversational 
dimension in which they take the initiative to raise issues and make (or are asked to make) 
argumentative contributions.  
We have used fine-grained models taken from Argumentation theory (Pragma Dialectics and 
Argumentum Model of Topics) as "lenses" to scrutinize the children's contributions in two corpora 
collected during free play and designed technical activities. This has led us to recognize the 
complex multi-layered activity in which children become involved when they contribute to an 
argumentative discourse. It has made us aware that, when we look at children in pedagogical 
situations, we often see only the "tip of the iceberg" i.e., the verbal production considered as the 
performance of an individual. Thereby, we bypass the implicit premises on which these 
productions rely. The latter can be deciphered through a close attention paid to the precise socio-
material and normative context of the conversation if we pay attention to the fact that what is 
being said is taking place between identified persons who have their own goals, think (rightly or 
wrongly) that they share common grounds, who indulge in trying to meet the others' expectations 
as they imagine them, and who unfold or co-construct their reasoning in interaction. From a 
psychological perspective, we have observed that when children argue they deploy important 
efforts in different directions, e.g., deciphering the goals of the adult and of the children who are 
partners; asserting oneself; finding one's way at the intersection of different worlds of meanings; 
exploring these worlds; securing one's voice or at least the acceptance by others of one's own 
contribution; interpreting the co-conversers statements; or even escaping the task set by the adult 
by finding alternatives! Our analyses reveal complex symbolic and relational work that children 
accomplish in order to produce argumentation. They also show how the issue discussed might 
not be the one that the adult asks (or expects) the children to discuss.  
Contemporary theories of argumentation invite us to consider forms of reasoning that put the 
reasonableness (and not only certitudes or opinions) at the center of attention. While the 
cognitive psychology of reasoning has traditionally focused on deductions and demonstrations, 
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we have used new means to study inference in children. The Argumentum Model of Topics, with 
its distinction between material-contextual premises and inferential-procedural premises, has 
offered us the possibility to walk in the footsteps of Piaget when he distinguishes static knowledge 
(physical, conventional, cultural facts) from operational knowledge (i.e., the mental operations 
that are applied to the facts). Instead of admitting the static knowledge as "facts" we have 
distinguished endoxon and material fact, and this has allowed us to observe that endoxa are not 
always aligned. For the fine-grained description of the child's cognitive moves, instead of using 
the Piagetian concept of "operation", we have called upon the concept of "locus", and this has 
uncovered some aspects of children's work on meaning, in particular the variety of inferences that 
they can make. 
In our data, we have observed young children actively participating in critical discussions. 
Their reasoning is traceable. It can be described as relying on maxims derived from different loci 
and on implicit or explicit data. “Obvious” or “visible” (in children's eyes) contextual aspects may 
make the explicitation of the entire argumentation superfluous. Children can produce multiple 
argumentations; their standpoints are seldom pre-existing to the conversation but are often co-
constructed, as are the issues. If the freedom rule is respected, children introduce issues, often 
via sub-discussions, but only if adults do not interrupt them as they often do, even when they 
don't intend to. Often the inferences that children make are not the ones that adults expect and 
the latter then tend to interrupt them. Reconstructing the components children leave implicit in 
their argumentation allows for a better understanding of the role that argumentation has in their 
interactions: their "Weltanschauung" as it is experienced and transformed by them when they 
meet other persons with their own “Weltanschauung", a new perspective on socio-cognitive 
conflict. We are presently also fascinated to discover how children can use argumentation to 
explore the world or to appeal to sources of "authority".  
From the perspective of Argumentation theory, because children reason and engage in 
argumentation in circumstances which are quite different from those of adult professionals or 
experts, they help us to shed a developmental light on argumentation: issues and standpoints are 
not always fixed but are likely to evolve in time: discussion issues are likely to be transformed as 
they are talked about; standpoints are not always present before being co-constructed in the on-
going dialogue. The change of focus that we have operated, moving from an analysis of 
argumentation as a "skill" to argumentation as a "contribution to a critical discussion", allows us to 
introduce this time perspective and to better comprehend the social, cultural and material 
dimensions of the reasoning as an embedded activity. Models borrowed from Argumentation 
Theory have been powerful analytical instruments. They can now be revisited in the light of the 
specifics of children's argumentation. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: This chapter is an extended and partly modified version of Perret-Clermont, A.N., 
Schär, R., Greco, S., Convertini, J., Iannaccone, A., and Rocci, A., "A contribution from Argumentation 
Theory to the study of young children's reasoning in play activities", which will be published in 2019 in the 
Proceedings of the Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation held in 
Amsterdam, July 2018.  
In this contribution we report some main findings of the research project “Analyzing young children’s implicit 
argumentation” (ArgImp), conducted thanks to contract no 100019-156690/1 with the Swiss National 
Research Foundation. Applicants: A.-N. Perret-Clermont, S. Greco, A. Iannaccone and A. Rocci. PhD 
students: R. Schär (who collected Corpus 1) and J. Convertini (Corpus 2).  
We thank the children who agreed to participate and their parents who gave us permission to enter their 
families, play with their children or work with them at school. Our thanks are also due to the teachers and the 
school authorities who have welcomed our research and given us access to their facilities. We are indebted 
to Athena Sargent for her help with language editing. 
15
REFERENCES 
Aakhus M., Muresan S., Wacholder N. (2017). An argument-ontology for a response-centered approach to 
argumentation mining. In: Bex, F., Grasso, F., Green, N. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 16th Workshop on 
Computational Models of Natural Argument (CMNA 2016), New York, USA, 9 July 2016. 
Online:http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1876/. 
Anderson, R. C., Chinn, C., Chang, J., Waggoner, M. & Yi, M. (1997). On the logical integrity of children’s 
arguments. Cognition and Instruction, 15(2), 135–167. 
Andriessen, J. E. B., & Schwarz, B. B. (2009). Argumentative design. In A. N. Perret-Clermont & N. Muller 
Mirza (Eds.), Argumentation and Education: theoretical foundations and practices (pp. 145-174): 
Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer. 
Asterhan, C. S. C., & Schwarz, B. B. (2007). The effects of monological and dialogical argumentation on 
concept learning in evolutionary theory. Journal of Educational Psychology, 99(3), 626-639. 
doi:10.1037/0022-0663.99.3.626. 
Baker, M., Andriessen, J., & Järvelä, S. (2013). Affective learning together. Social and emotional dimensions 
of collaborative learning. New York: Routledge. 
Banks-Leite, L. (1998). Langue et argumentation: considérations sur les échanges linguistiques à l’école 
maternelle. Psychologie de l’interaction, 7-8. 
Bernicot, J., Trognon, A., Guidetti, M. and Musiol, M. (Eds.) (2002). Pragmatique et psychologie. Nancy: 
Presses Universitaires de Nancy.  
Bruner, J. S. (1966). On cognitive growth. In J. S Bruner, R. R Olver, & P. M. Greenfield (Eds.), Studies in 
cognitive growth (pp. 1-67).  New York: Wiley.  
Carugati, F., & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (2015). Learning and instruction: social-cognitive perspectives. In J. 
D. W. (editor-in-chief) (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (2nd
ed., Vol. 13, pp. 670-676). Oxford: Elsevier.
Convertini, J. (2019). Contributo allo studio dei tipi di argomento in situazioni di problem solving tecnico da 
parte di bambini in età prescolare. Doctoral dissertation. Neuchâtel: Université de Neuchâtel. 
Convertini, J., Gfeller, F., Iannaccone, A. and Perret-Clermont, A.N. (2017). Construire sa place dans une 
activité collective entre enfants. Communication au Congrès de la Société Suisse pour la 
Recherche en Education (SSRE), 26-28 juin 2017. 
Danish, J. A., & Enyedy, N. (2015). Latour goes to kindergarten: Children marshaling allies in a spontaneous 
argument about what counts as science. Learning, Culture and Social Interaction, 5, 5-19. 
Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions. Dordrecht / 
Cinnaminson: Foris. 
Eemeren, F. H., van, & Grootendorst, R. (1987). Fallacies in pragma-dialectical perspective. Argumentation, 
1(3), 283–301. 
Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical 
account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Felton, M., & Kuhn, D. (2001). The development of argumentative discourse skill. Discourse Processes, 
32(2&3), 135-153. 
Golder, C. (1996). La production de discours argumentatifs : revue de questions. Revue Française de 
Pédagogie, 116(1), 119–134. 
Greco Morasso, S., Miserez-Caperos, C. & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (2015). L’argumentation à visée cognitive 
chez les enfants. Une étude exploratoire sur les dynamiques argumentatives et psychosociales. In 
N. Muller Mirza, & C. Buty (Eds.), L’argumentation dans les contextes de l’éducation (pp. 39–82).
Bern: Peter Lang.
Greco, S., Mehmeti, T., & Perret-Clermont, A. N. (2017). Do adult-children dialogical interactions leave 
space for a full development of argumentation? A case study. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 
6(2), 193-219. 
Greco, S., Perret-Clermont, A.-N., Iannaccone, A., Rocci, A., Convertini, J. & Schär, R. (2018). Analyzing 
implicit premises within children’s argumentative inferences. In S. Oswald, & D. Maillat (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation (pp. 147-167): Fribourg 2017. 
London: College Publications. 
Greco, S., Schär, R., Perret-Clermont, A.-N. & Iannaccone, A. (2017). Argumentation as a dialogic 
interaction in everyday talk: adults and children “playing by the rules” in board game play. 
Presented at the International Association for Dialogue Analysis IADA, Bologna. 
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics (pp. 
41–58). New York: Academic Press. 
Grize, J.-B. (1996). Logique naturelle et communications. Paris : Presses universitaires de France. 
Hundeide, K. (1985). The tacit background of children's judgments. In J. V. Wertsch (Ed.), Culture 
communication and cognition: Vygotskian perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Iannaccone, A., Perret-Clermont, A.N., and Convertini, J. (in preparation). Children as investigators of 
Brunerian “Possible worlds”. The role of narrative scenarios in children’s argumentative thinking. 
16
Jackson, S. (2018). Reason-giving and the natural normativity of argumentation. Topoi (online first), doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9553-5. 
Kohler, A.  (in preparation). Approches psychologiques de situations de malentendu dans des activités de 
didactique des sciences. Doctoral dissertation. University of Neuchâtel. 
Kuhn, D. (1991). The Skills of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kuhn, D. (1993). Science as argument: implications for teaching and learning scientific thinking. Science 
Education, 73(3), 319-337.  
Kuhn, D., & Park, S.-H. (2005). Epistemological understanding and the development of intellectual values. 
International Journal of educational research, 43(3), 111-124.  
Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking language, mind and world dialogically: interactional and contextual theories of 
human sense-making. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing. 
Lombardi, E., Greco, S., Massaro, D., Schär, R., Manzi, F., Iannaccone, A., Perret-Clermont, A.N. and 
Marchetti, A. (2018). Does a good argument make a good answer? Argumentative reconstruction of 
children's justifications in a second order false belief task. Learning, Culture and Social Interaction. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lcsi.2018.02.001. 
Miserez-Caperos, C. (2017). Etude de l'argumentation à visée cognitive dans des interactions entre adulte 
et enfants : un regard psychosocial sur le modèle pragma-dialectique. Thèse de doctorat. Institut de 
psychologie et éducation, Université de Neuchâtel. Retrieved from http://doc.rero.ch/record/289108. 
Muller Mirza, N., & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (Eds.). (2009). Argumentation and education. Theoretical 
foundations and practices. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Muller Mirza, N., Perret-Clermont, A.-N., Tartas, V., & Iannaccone, A. (2009). Psychosocial Processes in 
Argumentation. In N. Muller Mirza & A.-N. Perret-Clermont (Eds.), Argumentation and Education 
(pp. 67-90). Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer. 
Muller Mirza, N. (2010). Psychosocial dimensions in argumentative learning interactions: identity dynamics 
and transformation In M. Baker, J. Andriessen, & S. Järvelä (Eds.), Affective learning together (pp. 
233-250).
Musi, E., and Aakhus, M. (2018). Discovering argumentative patterns in energy polylogues: 
A macroscope for argument mining. Argumentation (online first): https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-
017-9441-y.
Nonnon, E. (1996). Activités argumentatives et élaboration de connaissances nouvelles : le dialogue comme 
espace d’exploration. Langue Française, 112(1), 67–87. 
Nonnon, E. (2015). Préface. L’argumentation dans les contextes de l’éducation. In N. Muller Mirza & C. Buty 
(Eds.), L’argumentation dans les contextes de l’éducation (pp. 1–11). Bern: Peter Lang. 
Perret-Clermont, A. N., Arcidiacono, F., Lamas-Breux, S., Greco, S., & Miserez-Caperos, C. (2015). 
Knowledge-oriented argumentation in children. In Scrutinizing Argumentation in Practice (pp. 135-
149). Amsterdam: Benjamins.  
Piaget, J. (1926). La représentation du monde chez l'enfant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
(Transl. in English: Piaget, J. (1929). The child's conception of the world. London, New York 
Harcourt, Brace and Co.). 
Piaget, J. (1972). Intellectual evolution from adolescence to adulthood. Human development, 15(1), 1-12. 
(republished: (2008). Intellectual evolution from adolescence to adulthood. Human development, 
51, 40-47).  
Piaget, J. (1974). La prise de conscience. Paris: PUF. 
Piaget, J. (1980). Les formes élémentaires de la dialectique. Paris: Gallimard. 
Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. (1967). La psychologie de l'enfant. Paris : PUF. (English edition 1969/2000, The 
psychology of the child. New York: Basic Books). 
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1966). La psychologie de l'enfant et de l'adolescent. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France (Transl. in English: Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The Psychology of the Child. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
Plantin, C. (1996). Le trilogue argumentatif. Présentation de modèle, analyse de cas. Langue Française, 
112, 9–30. 
Plantin, C. (2005). L’argumentation. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France. 
Pramling, N. & Säljö, R. (2015). The clinical interview: the child as a partner in conversation vs. the child as 
an object of research. In S. Robson & S. Flannery Quinn (Eds.), The Routledge International 
Handbook of Young Children’s Thinking and Understanding (pp. 87–95). Oxon: Routledge. 
Rapanta, C., Garcia-Mila, M. & Gilabert, S. (2013). What is meant by argumentative competence? An 
integrative review of methods of analysis and assessment in education. Review of Educational 
Research, 83(4), 483–520. 
Resnick, L. B., & Schantz, F. (2015). Re-thinking intelligence: schools that build the mind. European Journal 
of Education, 50(3), 340-349.  
Rigotti, E. & Greco Morasso, S. (2009). Argumentation as an object of interest and as a social and cultural 
resource. In N. Muller Mirza & A.N. Perret-Clermont (Eds.), Argumentation and education (pp. 1–
61). New York, NY: Springer. 
17
Rigotti, E. & Greco, S. (2019). Inference in argumentation: A topical approach to argument schemes. New 
York, NY: Springer. 
Rigotti, E., & Greco Morasso, S. (2010). Comparing the Argumentum Model of Topics to other contemporary 
approaches to argument schemes: the procedural and material components. Argumentation, 24, 
489-512. Retrieved from doi:10.1007/s10503-010-9190-7.
Rocci, A. (2005). Connective predicates in monologic and dialogic argumentation. Studies in Communication 
Sciences (Special Issue: Argumentation in Dialogic Interaction), 97-118 
Rocci, A. (2006). Pragmatic inference and argumentation in intercultural communication. Intercultural 
Pragmatics, 3 (4), 409-442 
Rocci, A. (2008). Analysing and evaluating persuasive media discourse in context. In: M. Burger (Ed.), 
L'analyse linguistique des discours médiatiques. Entre sciences du langage et sciences de la 
communication (pp. 247-284). Québec : Nota Bene 
Rommetveit, R. (1976). On the architecture of intersubjectivity. In L. H. Strickland, K. J. Gergen, & F. J. 
Aboud (Eds.), Social psychology in transition (pp. 215-221). New York: Plenum Press. 
Schär, R. (2018). On the negotiation of issues in discussions among small children and their parents. 
TRANEL Travaux Neuchâtelois de Linguistique, 68, 17–25. 
Schär, R. G. (2018). An argumentative analysis of the emergence of issues in adult-children discussions 
(PhD Dissertation). Università della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano. 
Schär, R., Greco, S. (2018 accepted). The emergence of issues in everyday discussions between adults and 
children. International Journal of Semiotics and Visual Rhetoric, 2(1).  
Schwarz, B. (2008). ESCALATE: The White Book. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
Schwarz, B., & Baker, M. (2017). Dialogue, argumentation and education: History, theory and practice. New 
York City, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Traverso, V. (1999). L’Analyse de la conversation. Paris: Editions Nathan. 
Trognon, A., Batt, M., Sorsana, C., & Saint-Dizier, V. (2011). Argumentation and dialogue. In A. Trognon, M. 
Batt, J. Caelen, & D. Vernant (Eds.), Logical properties of dialogue (pp. 147-186). Nancy: Presses 
Universitaires de Nancy (PUN). 
Veneziano, E. (Ed.) (1999). La conversation : instrument, objet et source de connaissance (Psychologie de 
l'interaction No7-8). Paris : L'Harmattan. 
APPENDIX : NOTATION SYSTEM 
sign description 
Ó raising intonation 
((  )) non verbal component 
(1.0) pause of 1 second 
= immediately following turn 
An::d lengthening of preceding vowel 
(.) micro pause 
[ ] interruption and overlapping 
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